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## IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMUNITY RELOCATION POLICY AFTER THE EARTHQUAKE, TSUNAMI, AND LIQUEFACTION IN PALU CITY

### Abstrak

Kebijakan relokasi merupakan aspek penting pasca bencana melanda, gempa bumi, tsunami dan likuifaksi di Kota Palu terutama pada sebuah upaya pemerintah melakukan relokasi warga di beberapa wilayah terdampak, kebijakan relokasi melalui proses yang terencana dengan mempertimbangan pada banyak aspek yang dianggap ampuh itu ternyata masih menyimpan masalah hingga saat ini, penelitian ini berusaha mengidentifikasi upaya yang dilakukan pemerintah pasca bencana terkhusus melalui kebijakan relokasi. Penelitian yang dilakukan satu tahun lebih setelah bencana terjadinya ini, melalui wawancara mendalam terhadap informan yang memiliki kompetensi tinggi terkait dengan pokok masalah yang diteliti, berhasil mengungkap keberhasilan implementasi kebijakan di satu sisi yang ditunjukkan kerelaan masyarakat menempati titik lokasi Hunian yang disediakan pemerintah, atau memilih kebijakan relokasi mandiri sebagai alternative kebijakan yang dihadirkan dan kegagalan di sisi lain yang ditunjukkan pada sikap beberapa warga korban bencana memilih bertahan di hunian sementara yang bersifat darurat, aspek komunikasi dan struktur birokrasi berada pada posisi dominan atas kegagalan implementasi kebijakan yang terungkap pada penelitian ini, yakni ketidak mampuan pemerintah meyakinkan warga untuk direlokasi dan ketidak tersediaan regulasi yang mengatur untuk mereka yang memilih bertahan dihuntara, meskipun dukungan pemerintah yang begitu besar atas kebijakan ini dan sumber daya yang tersedia terbilang lebih tidak dapat berbuat banyak atas kebuntuan yang terjadi.

**Kata Kunci:** Kebijakan, Bencana, Relokasi, Pemukiman.

### Abstract

The relocation policy is an important aspect after the occurrence of earthquakes, tsunami, and liquefaction in Palu City, particularly concerning the government's effort to relocate residents in the affected areas. The relocation policy through a planned process by considering many aspects still face some issues. This study aims to identify the government's effort after the disaster, particularly through relocation policies. This study was conducted one year after the disaster. The data were obtained from in-depth interviews with eligible informants who have high competence related to the issue. It revealed the success of the implementation of the policy as indicated by the willingness of the community to occupy the location provided by the government or to choose an independent relocation as an alternative policy. On the other hand, the implementation of the policy is failed as shown by the attitude of some victims who prefer to stay in temporary shelters. The communication aspects and bureaucratic structures become the main cause of the failure of the implementation. It is indicated by the lack of the government's ability to convince the residents to be relocated and the absence of regulations for those who prefer to stay in temporary shelters despite the government's great supports for this policy and the available resources.

**Keywords:** Policy, Disaster, Relocation, Settlement.

### INTRODUCTION

A great earthquake of 7.4 Magnitude attacked Donggala District, Palu City, and its surroundings on September 28 2018 at 17.02 WIB (Western Indonesian Time). The epicenter of the earthquake is at a depth of 10 km, precisely 27 km northeast of Donggala (Anggresta, 2019; Pribadi, 2018; Wahyuni & Marzuki, 2020). It causes great impacts to Palu City with enormous

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losses and death. Based on this condition, the government needs to take action through public policies to minimize losses. It requires appropriate recovery steps, particularly the long-term aspects of the policy. It covers ensuring the integration of policies with the stability of the affected community. Indeed, there are challenges particularly regarding the relocation of the affected community. In principle, post-disaster development policies have positive and negative consequences for the community, both in the short and long term. Thus, the post-disaster relocation process requires serious management for a better future.

Generally, the post-disaster relocation process produces bad impacts on social and economic aspects. It can be seen in many cases in disaster-stricken countries. However, a proper relocation process through careful consideration can at least reduce the possible negative impacts. This research was conducted a year after the earthquake, tsunami, and liquefaction disaster in Palu City. It examines the relocation policy of the affected community. Palu City is an autonomous region located in Central Sulawesi and this area is known as an earthquake-prone area as it has the highest tectonic activity in Indonesia. The existence of the Palu Koro fault, the fault that passes through Palu Bay makes the Central Sulawesi region prone to large magnitude earthquakes since 1968 with 6.7 SR, in 1993 with 5.8 SR, and in 2005 with 6.2 SR.

The earthquake that occurred on September 28, 2018, was the largest earthquake with a large magnitude caused a large number of casualties and the tsunami severely damaged the buildings on the coast. Even, the damage reached 300 meters away from the affected location. Besides, public infrastructure such as a bridge that connects two areas in Palu City was cut off due to the large magnitude of the earthquake and followed by tsunami waves along the coast. Moreover, liquefaction occurred in densely populated villages, namely Petobo and Balaroa Villages. It buried more than 1800 buildings with around 550 death.

One of the concerns in this disaster is the relocation policy for the affected community. Particularly, it focuses on whether to relocate the affected community to a new settlement with a low vulnerability scale with a possibility of disruption in socio-economic aspects of the community or rebuilding in the same location with readiness to accept the consequences of a disaster threat at an uncertain time.

## **METHODS**

This study used a qualitative approach with a case study design. The research was conducted in Palu City as an affected area with the greatest losses due to the earthquake, tsunami, and liquefaction that occurred on 28 September 2018. It used both primary and secondary data concerning the issue in implementing the post-disaster relocation policy in Palu City. Data were collected through in-depth-interviews using interview guidelines. Then, the data analysis covered data reduction, data presentation, and drawing conclusions.

## **RESULT AND DISCUSSION**

The community in Palu City suffered from the tsunami, earthquake, and liquefaction two years ago. The disaster caused severe infrastructure damage, poor economic conditions due to loss of property, and high number of death. Therefore, the recovery cannot be done in a short time and requires a well-planned development. Edwards III (Edward III, 1980) proposed four factors in the implementation of public policy, namely "communication, resources, disposition or attitudes, and bureaucratic structure." Those factors are considered crucial for each implementer in implementing public policy as they relate with one another.

### **Communication**

Edwards III proposed four factors in the implementation of policies. The communication factor is the most important in the success of the implementation of public policy. It is because communication is closely related to how the implementer conducts socialization to the community, parties involved in the socialization process, the obstacles and solutions in the socialization process, and communication with both internal and external parties in managing the relocation.

Concerning the socialization of the relocation, it was done through distributing forms to obtain information about the readiness of residents to be relocated. Then, the collected data were used as the basis for the follow-up policy. as an important part of carrying out a follow-up policy. The important information is the willingness of the affected community to be relocated

to the determined place by the government. To get accurate and reliable data and information, the village office official was involved in collecting the information. The forms were distributed to all village offices. This process classified residents who are willing to be relocated, residents who are not willing to be relocated, the desired relocation place, and even important reasons to be considered in the next relocation policy which often faces polemics and debates.

The structured investigation and identification of problems revealed some important points including refusal to the relocation and it still becomes an issue to present. The government tried to explain the relocation policy and it managed to solve the issue of the land status of the affected community which is in the red zone category by stating that the land status in the red zone is confirmed under the affected community's legal ownership, but it cannot be used as a residential area.

The Regional Agency for Disaster Management (BPBD) of Palu City played a vital role in the structured and planned socialization. Its implementation involved the village office that can reach and provide complete and accurate information. RT head is also involved in this process but some individuals still do not know the detailed information from the socialization. Even though the relocation policy has been well-planned, there are two challenges, namely the refusal of the relocation and the land status issue. They concern about the land status that they left behind, the location of the permanent shelter. It is known that the location has been managed by residents long before the relocation plan. In this case, the government has taken a firm stance by adhering to the prevailing laws and regulations, in which the permanent shelter status is Buildings rights.

The socialization process also faces another challenge besides the land status issue in which the affected community felt it was too hard to leave their hometown as it is meaningful for them and it becomes no longer a proper location for settlement. Therefore, some prefer to stay in temporary shelters while urging the government to immediately fulfill their wishes. The solution is by rebuilding the house in their hometown, particularly at some points outside of the red zone.

The government has provided an alternative relocation policy to end the polemic through independent permanent shelter. This policy provides opportunities for the affected community not to be relocated to a place determined by the government. This policy allows the affected community to build an independent permanent shelter in the desired location as long as it is outside the red zone. The affected community accepts this policy as they can determine the location for building their permanent shelter. This policy also ultimately resolves the issues related to the refusal to be relocated to the predetermined location.

The independent relocation policy manages to resolve the issue. This policy allows the affected community to build a permanent shelter in the desired location or close to their families or workplace. However, this policy is applicable for the affected community who own land themselves, while others who do not own land cannot get the benefits of this policy so that they have to stay in the temporary shelter provided by the government which is still uncertain.

The management of the relocation process to solve all emerging issues and the communication between the involved in implementing this policy is good, even though it was unable to convince residents to show a willingness to stay at the permanent shelter provided by the government or prefer to have independent relocation as an alternative to solve the issue. At the implementation level, the communication between the reconstruction task force, the government, and the BPBD of Palu City is good.

### **Resources**

Resources become an important part of the successful implementation of public policy. Resources are closely related to the number of human resources to implement relocation management, adequacy of resources, the ability of implementers in implementing policies, training to improve the quality of human resources, facilities to support the relocation management, the budget sources for the implementation of the relocation management, sources of funds used in the implementation of relocation management, the adequacy of the budget for the policy implementation.

The successful implementation of public policies are affected by many aspects including resources in which besides financial support, the implementer is also important. It does not only

in terms of quantity but also quality. It means the implementer has to be trained and professional.

The post-disaster relocation policy involved adequate resources in terms of quantity. It involved the central, provincial, and district/city governments, especially Palu City. Further, it involved the government to sub-district and village levels. Even, the RT head was involved to collect data/information to maintain the accuracy and reliability of the data. Indeed, there were errors, but they are not crucial and can be corrected.

The resources are sufficient in terms of quantities as it involves all parties. Further, the relocation also involves NGOs that provide both financial and human resource supports. The NGO engages in the provision of basic facilities for the community and the construction of a permanent shelter for the affected community. Zhu Chi Buddhist foundation greatly contributed to the reconstruction of 1500 permanent shelters for the affected community.

The Palu City government which has taken an important part in the relocation policy, especially at the executive level, is considered to have good capability in managing the relocation. However, it has a limitation in terms of financial capacity. Indeed, budget constraints are inevitable in the relocation policy, for example, the Zhu Chi Buddhist foundation has provided 1500 permanent shelters but the applicant reaches 1800 people. It means 300 people can not get the benefit of this permanent shelter. To address this issue, the government plans to include them in PUPR (Ministry of Public Works and Housing). Currently, it is known that the permanent shelter provided by Buddha Zhu Chi and AH Center has been occupied.

Generally, in terms of relocation policy, the government can solve all the remaining issues, but the time constrain is unavoidable. It is not easy to address all issues at the same time. Communities think that the government is slower in addressing the issue compared to NGOs. It is important to notice that the government and NGOs work with different models. The NGO is appreciated for fast work. The determinant of the speed in working is the construction process in which before the government starts the construction of the permanent shelter, it is proceeded with collecting data on the number of the occupant. In contrast, the NGO starts the construction first before determining the target occupant. Thus, the government seems to work slower than the NGO.

The government has assigned a special team for collecting data, namely from the PU (Public Works Agency). The main task of this team is recording the qualifications of the housing conditions of the affected community. To ensure the quality and accuracy of the data, before the field data collection, the team was trained. However, the beneficiary of the permanent shelter is not specified as it is only based on the validity of required documents, such as legal heir certificate, SKPT, Freehold Certificate, grants, and Land and Building Tax (PBB) are eligible for permanent shelter facilities.

The permanent shelter policy has been managed professionally, as the management is handled by the relevant division, for example, the issue of land certificates, then it involved public land agency that is professional in managing the land issue. Concerning the certificate issue, the public land agency has issued certificate registration numbers in some areas that are severely affected by disasters causing the affected community to lose their certificate. Further, the proof of ownership can be from PBB and electricity tokens as well as share loc using satellite before the disaster occurs.

The quality of human resources is an important part of the success of a policy, while the budget can be viewed simply. Concerning the budget, it is supported by many parties, especially the central government. Further, the Palu City government also contributes to the budget but not as much as the central government. The Palu City government concerns about the aspect of infrastructure development under the city's responsibility such as road construction. Moreover, the provincial government also contributes to infrastructure development, especially the reconstruction of the damaged roads under the provincial responsibility.

The budget allocated for the relocation policy is not small. Thus, some may question why the available budget is not able to quickly address all issues. It is important to notice that the budget management for the relocation policy is carried out in stages, thus the issues are addressed gradually. Some are resolved in the first stage and others are at the next stage. The emergency response stage has a different budget allocation from the rehabilitation and reconstruction stages. It is undeniable that the available budget for handling relocation is quite

large, but considering the issues, the budget is not sufficient to solve all issues. Many damaged infrastructures have not got budget allocation for the reconstruction. However, the budget is considered sufficient to address important and urgent issues.

### **Disposition**

Another aspect affecting the success of the implementation of policies is disposition. In this case, the disposition is interpreted as willingness, desires, and tendencies of policy actors to implement the policy; efforts to realize the goal of the policy. The successful implementation of a policy does not only require resources and communication but also willingness to implement the policy. It is because willingness results in a strong effort. It can be seen in the attitude of the policy implementers in implementing regulations on relocation management. The full support of the regional government, the commitment of the implementer, the supervision and control, and the obstacles in implementing the relocation policy.

The government has shown serious attitudes in the post-disaster relation policy as evidenced by the great amount of budget allocated and the manpower involved. Indeed there are many weaknesses for the success of a policy. However, they are beyond the limits of the government's ability as the government has to address the issue gradually which requires much time. Meanwhile, the government still tries to address the remaining issues to date.

Further, the regional government has provided wide land for the location of the permanent shelter. The regional government also involves all government levels including the smallest level, for example, related agencies, sub-districts, village heads, and RT. RT is especially involved in data collection. The coordination between the local government and all related agencies is established along with the implementation of the relocation policy. Support for the success of the relocation policy can also be seen in how the government has designed a populist policy through an independent relocation policy for residents who do not want to be relocated to a predetermined place.

The executive level in implementing the relocation policy looks good. Indeed, there are obstacles during the implementation of the policy, but they can be addressed through various efforts. Concerning the community responses, some show willingness to be relocated to the predetermined location and some others refuse it by keeping staying at the temporary shelter.

### **Bureaucratic Structure**

Bureaucracy also plays a role in the successful implementation of a policy. In the government institution, bureaucracy gets privileges as a policy implementer. In another case, bureaucracy has a broad scope as it is also an important part of private agencies. The bureaucratic structure is important as it shows the organizational structure in managing the relocation, the division of authority and responsibility, standard operational procedures, the results of relocation, and decision-making related to relocation management. In the case of the post-disaster relocation policy in Palu City, it involved some government agencies including PUPR, Housing and Settlement Agency, and BPBD. Each agency has different responsibilities in which the Housing and Settlements Service and BPBD works on data affairs, while PUPR works on physical works.

The clear division of work and responsibilities shows that government agencies have big roles in the relocation policy. It means that the bureaucracy functions as a driving force that greatly contributes to the success of the policy. In the implementation of the relocation policy, as stated previously, each agency has different tasks and responsibilities, for example, Housing and Settlement Agency and BPBD jointly manage data. BPBD played a major role in collecting data on the damages caused by the disaster, while the Housing and Settlement Agency deals with data related to housing, and the PUPR deals with physical works such as the construction of public infrastructure.

As a government agency, PUPR has full responsibilities in handling the building construction. BPBD and the Housing Agency manage the data. Besides, the relocation policy also involves the TNI (Indonesian National Military) in the acceleration process of the rehabilitation and reconstruction. In terms of NGOs, the Buddha Zhu Chi foundation also contributes to the construction of 1,500 housing units in Permanent Shelter Tondo 1, while the AH Center contributes to 100 housing units. Moreover, Apeksi of the Surabaya government contributes 11 housing units. It can be seen that the relocation policy shows strong cooperation among various parties.

The optimal implementation of the relocation policy has to be realized through clear regulation, task division, done, and standard operational procedures. The government set the standard size of type 36 in the land size of 10x15 meters for permanent shelter. It used 'design tumbuh' enable to add buildings without demolishing the main building built by the government. This standard applies to all permanent shelters either built by the government or other parties.

Regarding the results of the relocation management policy, particularly the construction of permanent shelters, the government has managed to build permanent shelters in two locations of Tondo 1 and Duyu. The plan for this year is to build 100 units in Tondo 2 located behind the Province Police Office. Then, next year will be continued with the construction of a permanent shelter in Talise. The government has determined five locations for permanent shelter through the governor's decree. It covers Tondo 1 located behind the campus, Tondo 2 located behind Talise Province Police Office, Duyu, and Balaroo, while the rest is independent relocation built independently by residents who do not want to be relocated to the predetermined location instead they can build in their land as long as outside the red zone.

The obstructed construction of permanent shelters for relocated residents due to the long stages of relocation policy. Indeed, the permanent shelter construction has been well planned but it is delayed due to many things. So some affected communities have to wait for a maximum next year as long as no significant obstacles. The determination of the location for relocation involves many parties including the Palu City government, governors, regents, and mayors of affected areas. In this aspect of the bureaucratic structure, the issue deals with the affected community that is not willing to be relocated to the determined location and does not meet the requirement for independent relocation.

## CONCLUSION

This study has succeeded in revealing the success of policy implementation as indicated by the willingness of some affected communities to occupy the shelter in the location determined by the government. The construction of the temporary shelters has been completed and fully occupied. It means that the relocation to the determined location is accepted by some affected communities. Even, there is an alternative for independent relocation for those who refuse the relocation to the determined location due to some reasons, including the distance to the workplaces (farmers, fisherman). Another reason is socio-culture in which some prefer to stay in their hometown and do not want to be separated from their families, as well as have no private land for independent relocation. However, considering the reasons for refusal, the government's ability to communicate policies and convince the affected community to accept the policies, the community who are not eligible for the independent relocation due to having no private land outside the red zone, and regulation for those who prefer to stay at temporary shelters should be noticed and addressed.

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